C-UAS LAW BY STATE / WISCONSIN

Wisconsin — Assembly Bill 629 (crossfiled SB 626): police authority to disable drones threatening public safety (distinct from the enacted Wis. Stat. § 941.292 row)

Introduced bill modeled on Louisiana's approach; would let a law enforcement officer intercept, disable, or destroy a drone when they "reasonably suspect it poses an imminent threat to public safety," and would define a weaponized drone. Requested by the Police Chief Association of Waukesha County. Part of the post-Louisiana wave of states authorizing drone mitigation, and sits in tension with federal law (18 U.S.C. § 32).

Who can act: Wisconsin law enforcement officers (if enacted).

2025 Assembly Bill 629 (crossfiled with Senate Bill 626), 'police authority to disable drones threatening public safety and providing a penalty'; amends Wis. Stat. 114.045. Introduced 2025-11-07. Passed Assembly 2026-02-17 (57-42) and concurred by the Senate 2026-03-17; vetoed by the Governor 2026-04-03; Assembly override failed 2026-05-13 (veto sustained). Did not become law.

Wisconsin — Wis. Stat. § 941.292 (weaponized drone, Class H felony), § 942.10 (privacy), § 175.55 (LE warrant) [enacted]

Wisconsin's enacted drone laws span three angles. Possessing or operating a weaponized drone is a Class H felony (§ 941.292, up to 6 years), exempting only U.S. armed forces and the national guard. Using a drone to photograph, record, or observe someone where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy is a Class A misdemeanor, rising to a Class I felony on a repeat (§ 942.10). And law enforcement may not use a drone to gather evidence or surveil in privacy-protected areas without a warrant, except in emergencies (§ 175.55). Hunting/fishing/trapping interference is separately barred (§ 29.083). This is the enacted layer; Wisconsin's separate AB 629 mitigation bill (police authority to disable threatening drones) is tracked as a pending item.

Who can act: Wisconsin, criminal prohibitions enforced by state/local law enforcement; LE drone use for evidence-gathering/surveillance in privacy-protected areas requires a warrant (§ 175.55), with emergency exceptions. Military/national guard exempt from the weaponization ban. Separate pending bill AB 629 would add active drone-mitigation authority. No enacted drone-mitigation authority yet.

Wis. Stat. § 941.292 (possession/operation of a weaponized drone, Class H felony); § 942.10 (use of a drone to observe in a place with reasonable expectation of privacy, Class A misd. / Class I felony repeat); § 175.55 (law-enforcement drone use restricted; warrant); § 29.083 (interference with hunting/fishing/trapping)

10 U.S.C. § 130i — Protection of Certain Facilities and Assets from Unmanned Aircraft (DoD authority)

DoD's primary counter-UAS authority, lets the military detect, track, and mitigate drones threatening covered DoD facilities and assets. Originated in the FY2018 NDAA (Sec. 1692). A partial termination affecting certain covered-asset categories is set for December 31, 2026 (the President may extend it 180 days on a national-security certification before November 15, 2026). The FY2026 NDAA added a public annual-use reporting requirement and directed review of how the military departments interpret the authority.

Who can act: Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense and designees, to protect covered DoD facilities and assets in the United States.

10 U.S.C. § 130i; Sec. 1692, FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91)

10 U.S.C. § 199 — Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (DoD counter-small-UAS coordination and approval authority)

Section 912 of the FY2026 NDAA created Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401) in 10 U.S.C. § 199, transferring counter-small-UAS responsibility from the Army to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Director reports to the Deputy Secretary and is the principal advisor on counter-sUAS matters. The Task Force leads and coordinates DoD counter-sUAS efforts, maintains the C-sUAS strategic plan, and validates and approves systems for Department use; under § 912(e) no DoD component may procure a counter-sUAS system unless JIATF-401 has validated and approved it, subject to limited waivers.

Who can act: Director of JIATF-401, reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; validation and approval authority over DoD counter-sUAS procurement under 10 U.S.C. § 199 and FY2026 NDAA § 912(e), with limited waivers.

10 U.S.C. § 199; FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60), § 912

10 U.S.C. § 6227 — Protection of Certain Nuclear Facilities and Assets from Unmanned Aircraft (DOE/NNSA)

FY2026 NDAA provision providing DOE's current counter-UAS authority for nuclear sites: detect, identify, monitor/track, intercept control communications, warn, and disrupt, seize, or disable a threatening drone; directs DOE and DOT to issue implementing regulations. Replaced the prior DOE authority at 50 U.S.C. § 2661, which the same FY2026 NDAA repealed. DOE is one of the four federal C-UAS agencies, alongside DoD (§ 130i) and DHS/DOJ (§ 124n).

Who can act: Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, to protect covered NNSA facilities, national security laboratories, and nuclear weapons facilities.

10 U.S.C. § 6227; recodified by FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60, § 3111), which repealed former 50 U.S.C. § 2661 (DOE authority originally enacted via the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328)

49 U.S.C. § 44810 — Airport Safety and Airspace Hazard Mitigation and Enforcement (FAA)

The FAA's counter-UAS authority, but narrow: limited to FAA testing and evaluation of detection and mitigation systems at five airports (initial testing at Atlantic City, then Syracuse, Rickenbacker, Huntsville, and Seattle-Tacoma), and it cannot be delegated. Section 44810(a) requires the FAA to coordinate with DoD, DHS, and other agencies so C-UAS systems don't interfere with safe airport operations or the national airspace system. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (§ 904) extended this testing authority through September 30, 2028.

Who can act: FAA Administrator only, cannot be delegated to other federal, state, local, territorial, or tribal agencies or to airport sponsors. Limited to FAA testing/evaluation at five airports.

49 U.S.C. § 44810; FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254); testing authority extended to Sept. 30, 2028 by FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63, § 904)

50 U.S.C. § 2661 — Protection of Certain Nuclear Facilities and Assets from Unmanned Aircraft (DOE) [repealed]

DOE's counter-UAS authority from 2016 to 2025, let the Secretary of Energy detect, track, and mitigate drones threatening covered nuclear facilities and assets (those owned by or contracted to the US to store or use special nuclear material). Repealed by the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60), which replaced it with new DOE nuclear-site authority (NDAA § 3111). Retained here as the predecessor authority for lineage.

Who can act: Secretary of Energy (historical, 2016–2025), to protect covered DOE nuclear facilities and assets. Superseded.

50 U.S.C. § 2661; added by Sec. 3112, FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Dec. 23, 2016; repealed by FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60), Dec. 18, 2025

6 U.S.C. § 124n — Protection of Certain Facilities and Assets from Unmanned Aircraft

The central US federal C-UAS authority, lets DHS and DOJ detect, track, and mitigate drones over covered facilities and assets despite other federal laws. Lapsed briefly during the October 2025 government shutdown, then reauthorized through the FY2026 NDAA; currently set to expire September 30, 2031.

Who can act: DHS and DOJ federally. FY2026 NDAA directs DHS and the Attorney General to issue rulemaking (due ~180 days after Dec 18, 2025) extending C-UAS authority to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies.

6 U.S.C. § 124n; Pub. L. 115-254 div. H (Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018)

E.O. 14305 — Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty (counter-UAS task force; detection/tracking; critical-infrastructure & mass-gathering protection)

The directly counter-UAS executive order. E.O. 14305 sets U.S. policy to protect the public, critical infrastructure, mass-gathering events, and military/sensitive sites from careless or unlawful UAS use, and establishes a Federal Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty (chaired by the National Security Advisor) to review operational, technical, and regulatory frameworks and propose solutions to UAS threats. It directs agencies to use existing authorities to detect, track, and identify drones and their signals (consistent with the Fourth Amendment); revise the August 2020 advisory guidance; have the FAA share real-time Remote ID data with SLTT agencies; let DOJ/DHS grant programs fund SLTT detection/tracking equipment; publish guidance for private critical-infrastructure owners; weigh designating borders, major airports, federal facilities, critical infrastructure, and military installations as covered assets; and explore folding counter-UAS responses into Joint Terrorism Task Forces for mass gatherings (with the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympics in view). An executive order directs agencies but does not itself grant new mitigation authority, that still flows from §§ 124n/130i. H.R. 4590 (119th) would codify it.

Who can act: Federal executive branch, directs DHS, DOJ, DoD, DOT/FAA, and FCC (via a National-Security-Advisor-chaired task force) to expand drone detection/tracking/identification, share Remote ID data with SLTT agencies, fund SLTT detection equipment, and study covered-asset designations and JTTF counter-UAS integration. Directive only; actual mitigation authority still derives from 6 U.S.C. § 124n and 10 U.S.C. § 130i.

Exec. Order No. 14305, 90 Fed. Reg. 24719 (June 11, 2025); signed June 6, 2025; § 4 (Federal Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty, chaired by the APNSA); § 7 (detection, tracking, identification of drones/drone signals); §§ 8–9 (general protections; building counter-UAS capacity)

E.O. 14307 — Unleashing American Drone Dominance (domestic UAS industrial base; BVLOS; foreign-drone restrictions)

The industrial-base companion to E.O. 14305. E.O. 14307 directs fast-tracked federal action to build a 'strong and secure domestic drone sector', the FAA to enable routine Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations for commercial and public-safety missions and publish an updated UAS-integration roadmap, agencies to prioritize U.S.-manufactured drones over foreign-built ones, and Commerce to promote civil-drone exports. Less a counter-UAS measure than a supply-chain/airspace-integration order, but relevant to the tracker because it reshapes which systems agencies and operators may buy and how they may fly, and it pairs with the December 2025 FCC ban on new foreign-made drones. Directive only; no mitigation authority. Costs of publication borne by DOT.

Who can act: Federal executive branch, directs DOT/FAA (BVLOS rulemaking, integration roadmap), Commerce (export promotion), and procuring agencies (prioritize U.S.-made UAS). Directive only; no drone-mitigation authority granted.

Exec. Order No. 14307, 90 Fed. Reg. 24729 (June 11, 2025); signed June 6, 2025; directs DOT/FAA to enable routine Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, prioritize U.S.-manufactured UAS, and promote civil-drone exports

FAA NPRM: Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility (Section 2209)

Implements Section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016: establishes a process for owners and proprietors of certain fixed-site facilities (critical infrastructure, oil refineries and chemical facilities, amusement parks, and other discretionary sites) to request unmanned aircraft flight restrictions (UAFRs). Directed by Executive Order 14305. Comment period closes 2026-07-06.

FAA NPRM, 14 CFR Parts 1, 74, 91, 107. Docket FAA-2026-4558, Notice 26-03, RIN 2120-AL33.

H.R. 5061 — Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act (119th Cong.)

Bipartisan standalone reauthorization and reform bill, approved by the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee. Sets C-UAS training standards and establishes the first-ever Counter-UAS Mitigation Law Enforcement Pilot Program. Its path is now uncertain because the FY2026 NDAA carried the reauthorization instead.

H.R. 5061 (119th Congress), 'Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act', sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino; introduced 2025-08-29; ordered to be reported (amended) 60-0 by the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee on 2025-09-03. Still in committee; not yet passed by the House.

SAFER SKIES Act — FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60) §124n reauthorization and SLTT counter-UAS expansion

Most recent reauthorization of §124n, extends DHS/DOJ C-UAS authority to September 30, 2031 and, for the first time, directs rulemaking to authorize state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies to conduct C-UAS activities.

Pub. L. 119-60 (FY2026 NDAA), amends 6 U.S.C. § 124n

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